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ADOPTION, AND LIMITS ON HUMAN DECISION
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Molly J. Walker Wilson*
If people make systematic errors, perhaps government has, more often than anti-
paternalists think, good reason to override their choices. 
1
My argument here is that surrogacy contracts are suboptimal because the surrogate
cannot ex ante have perfect, or even minimally adequate, information. It is not, then,
her ex post regret that drives the analysis. It is that she cannot have predicted
accurately what the situation will be at closing time. She cannot have gauged
precisely the longterm effects of what she promised before conception. Specific
enforcement of the terms of the surrogacy contract is, therefore, inappropriate.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether surrogacy contracts should be enforced is one of the more
controversial topics in family law today.3 Opponents of surrogacy enforcement worry
about the potential for exploitation of the surrogate,
4 the commodification of women 5
and children,6 and the potential psychological harm to the surrogate child 7 and children
* J.D., University of Virginia School of Law. Ph.D. Psychology, University of Virginia School of Arts and
Sciences.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 751 (2003) (book review).
2. Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard
Epstein's Surrogacy: The Casefor Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REv. 2377, 2388 (1995).
3. See HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 13 (1994).
4. See Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered?,
68 IND. L.J. 205, 232 (1992) (asserting that "[i]t is unrealistic to believe that all of the harms associated with
surrogacy can be eliminated"); see also Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate Reasons
and Surrogacy Policies, 60 TENN. L. REv. 135, 209-17 (1992).
5. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections of Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 341, 351 (1991) ("The
feminist argument against the market is roughly that in this nonideal world of ours, treating women like
anonymous fungible breeders objectifies them and recreates subordination."). Carol Pateman wrote, "The
political implications of the surrogacy contract can only be appreciated when surrogacy is seen as another
provision in the sexual contract, as a new form of access to and use of women's bodies by men." CAROL
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 209-10 (1988).
6. See THOMAS A. SHANNON, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE ETHICS OF USING HUMAN BEINGS
156-57 (1988) (suggesting that surrogacy is the moral equivalent of baby-selling); see also LARRY GOSTIN, A
Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 3,
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of the surrogate mother. 8 Proponents, on the other hand, argue that failure to enforce
these contracts undermines a woman's ability to contract freely for the use of her body
9
and that women should be given the opportunity to provide this service to childless
couples. To date, commentators on both sides of the debate have, for the most part,
failed to take advantage of the rich wealth of knowledge available from those who study
psychology, and more broadly, human behavior. Specifically, while human beings'
tendency to use heuristics and to be subject to biases is directly relevant to the
surrogacy debate, behavioral research on heuristics and biases has received little
attention by those who write about surrogacy and adoption. This omission is important
because research reveals that human beings have limited capacity to make "rational"
decisions pertaining to precommitments-a topic that is directly relevant to a decision
about whether to allow women to bind themselves in surrogacy agreements.
10
This Article will argue that women who enter surrogacy contracts can never truly
give informed consent because there is no way that they can know before conceiving
the child how they will feel about giving up the child once the time comes.11
Supporters of the enforcement of surrogacy contracts have argued that detailed
disclosure of the risks and implications of surrogacy, along with the highly publicized
stories of surrogacy arrangements gone bad, provide fair warning to potential
surrogates. 12  However, behavioral research suggests that individuals are unable to
accurately predict what will be in their best interest at some future point in time.
13
Specifically, two heuristics are particularly pertinent to surrogacy contracts: the
optimistic bias and the endowment effect. 14 The optimistic bias relates to individuals'
tendency to underestimate risks or negative consequences down the road. 15  In
13 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990) (proposing that surrogacy is a form of baby-selling if the surrogate contract is
specifically enforced).
7. Michelle Pierce-Gealy, Comment, "Are You My Mother?": Ohio's Crazy-Making Baby-Making
Produces a New Definition of "Mother," 28 AKRON L. REV. 535, 563-64 (1995) (arguing that "[w]hen the
gestational mother is denied parental status, her bundle of responsibilities far outweighs her vested rights. She
is a legal stranger to the fetus/child. As such, she risks tort liability to both the genetic parents and the fetus,
criminal liability, and is in danger of sacrificing her individual right of privacy for the fetus's well-being.").
8. Joan H. Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital
Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 865, 902 (1985); see also Brnig, supra note 2, at 2384-85 (providing
examples of children's fear of being given away by their parents).
9. Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
72, 76 (1988) [hereinafter Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood]; see also Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything
Wrong With Surrogate Motherhood? An Ethical Analysis, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 57, 60 (1988)
("Feminists who oppose surrogacy presume to speak for all women. But what they are really saying is that
those who elect to enter surrogacy arrangements are incompetent to choose and stand in need of protection.").
10. See infra Part Ill.
11. From a psychological standpoint, writers express their concern that surrogates, particularly those who
have not yet gone through childbirth, cannot know in advance how difficult it will be to give the child up.
See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 2, at 2381.
12. Well known examples of papers making these types of arguments are Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy:
The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995) and Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), both of which will be
discussed in detail in this Article. See also Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 9, at 74 (arguing that
"with volumes of publicity given to the plight of Mary Beth Whitehead, all potential surrogates are now aware
of the possibility that they may later regret their decisions").
13. See notes 49-71 infra and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY
& SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
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economic terms, the endowment effect captures the idea that people place particular
value on goods that they already hold, and value them above other goods with
equivalent market values. 16 In the context of child bearing, this theory would predict
that surrogates, by virtue of carrying a child for nine months, value that child above and
beyond what would be rationally predicted. The status quo bias and optimistic bias
together suggest (a) that surrogates will initially fail to predict their level of attachment
to the unborn child and will discount the risk that they will not want to surrender the
child after birth and (b) that nobody (including the surrogate) will be able to foresee
how much the surrogate will value the child once she has gestated the child for nine
months.17 Consideration of these biases suggests additional reasons to advise caution in
permitting and enforcing surrogacy contracts.
In addition to these two biases, a third psychological phenomenon called "cognitive
dissonance" is also relevant to any discussion of surrogacy. Cognitive dissonance
theory posits that individuals experience discomfort when their beliefs and their actions
are discrepant. 18  This discomfort is resolved when the individual eliminates or
minimizes the discrepancy between the belief and the action, either by modifying the
belief or by changing the action. Because the gestation period for human beings is nine
calendar months, surrogates have quite a long time to experience discomfort about their
decision. Even if a surrogate started out being comfortable with the idea of giving up
the baby at the conclusion of the pregnancy, social influence may cause her to
experience a shift in attitude over the course of the nine months. The modification in
her beliefs may be difficult or impossible to reverse because the social influence is ever-
present. Therefore, the surrogate may end up resolving the dissonance by altering her
"action" in order to bring it into line with her attitude by changing her mind about
releasing the baby to the intended parents.
Many arguments against enforcement of surrogacy contracts have been advanced.
This Article focuses on one particular argument: surrogacy arrangements are a bad idea
because it is impossible for the surrogate mother to be fully informed at the time that
she agrees to enter the surrogacy contract. This is not an original idea. Others have
advanced the notion that some measure of paternalism is necessary in the case of
surrogacy arrangements for this very reason. 19 These commentators typically point out
that abandoning rights in a child is not equivalent to abandoning rights in an
automobile, a tract of land, or a piece of abstract art. According to this line of
16. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering
Awards, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 259,261 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 2000).
17. Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, BEHAVIORAL
LAW & ECONOMICS 116 (C. Sunstein, ed., 2000) (for a discussion of the status quo bias); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Introduction, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, 1, 4 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed. 2000) (describing the
optimistic bias).
18. See generally LEON A. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (discussing
cognitive dissonance theory comprehensively).
19. One judge said, "[S]uch consents [before the birth of the child] fail to allow for one of nature's
strongest instincts. who knows what the reaction will be of a mother once she sees her baby?" Johnson v.
Cupp, 274 N.E.2d 411,418 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (Buchanan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
20. Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 303, 309 (1993) ("On the other hand, enforcement means increased commodification of
women's bodies. It means that we are willing to treat what is an essential aspect of a woman's being, her
relationship with a child at the end of pregnancy, as something that is fungible and traded on a market.").
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reasoning, traditional property alienation rules are simply inappropriate in the context of
a surrogacy contract.
Some have argued that viewing surrogacy contracts as involving the sale of a
(parental) right is the wrong way to think about them. Instead, these pro-surrogacy
advocates generally characterize surrogacy as the providing of a service. 21 However,
this portrayal is somewhat misleading. Certainly, surrogacy involves providing a
service. However, it also involves abandoning a very important right. Rights attached
to parenthood have consistently been characterized by courts, including the Supreme
Court, as fundamental. 22 If providing a service was all that was involved in a surrogacy
arrangement, then presumably the surrogate would retain rights in the child along with
the biological father. She would have performed the service necessary to make the
biological father a parent. However, this is clearly not what is intended when a couple
seeks out a surrogate. Normally, at the moment of conception, a woman gains parental
rights in a potential child.23 A surrogacy contract specifically asks a woman to give up
the right to raise that child. The intended parents have little interest in the surrogate's
services without this relinquishment. It is clear, therefore, that what is at stake in a
surrogacy contract is rights to a child, and not merely the performance of a service.
Part II of this Article discusses the similarities between free market (or contract)
adoption and surrogacy. Part III characterizes surrogacy as a form of precommitment,
laying out the philosophical and practical difficulties with precommitments generally.
The heart of the Article, Part IV, explains the optimism bias, endowment effect, the
problem of market manipulation, and cognitive dissonance. This Article illustrates how
the existence of these empirically supported principles of human behavior preclude true
informed consent where surrogacy contracts are concerned. Specifically, Part IV
demonstrates that women who enter surrogacy contracts are subject to a specific set of
heuristics and biases that make them particularly likely to make errors about how
willing they will be to relinquish rights in the baby after it is born. Part IV also explains
how the intended parents, who generally have more resources than the surrogate
mother, by controlling the purse strings, are in a position to manipulate the market.
Specifically, couples, desperate to become parents, are able to present information to
the potential surrogate in ways that exploit existing biases, putting candidates for
surrogacy in an especially bad position to enter a precommitment. Part V addresses
famous arguments in favor of surrogacy contracts written by Richard Epstein and
21. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (stating that payment to the surrogate was for
"her services in gestating the fetus and undergoing labor, rather than for giving up 'parental' rights to the
child."). It is important to note that this was a gestational surrogacy situation, where the surrogate was not
biologically related to the child. However, it is not clear that the lack of a biological connection between the
surrogate and the child is sufficient to terminate parental rights of the surrogate. In fact, the court
acknowledged that both women had presented acceptable proof of maternity.
22. See Troxille v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that a Washington statute, Wash. Rev. Code §
26.10.160(3), unconstitutionally interfered with the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children. The
Court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right to
make child-rearing decisions.).
23. I use the term "potential child" throughout this Article to refer to an unborn child, or fetus. I am
acutely aware of the potential objection in referring to a fetus as a child, but given the forward-looking nature
of surrogacy contracts, it seems inappropriate to use the term "fetus"--particularly when many surrogacy
contracts involve the forfeiture of payment if the surrogate miscarries or the baby does not survive the birth
process.
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Richard Posner, pointing out not only the inconsistencies and flawed logic in the two
arguments, but also Epstein's and Posner's failure to address concerns raised by
behavioral research. Part VI includes other arguments against surrogacy from the legal
scholarship. Finally, the Conclusion calls for courts and legislatures to pay heed to
findings from the fields of psychology and behavioral law and economics and to not
enforce surrogacy contracts.
II. SURROGACY AND ADOPTION IN THE "FREE MARKET"
Surrogacy and adoption are both methods that childless people (usually same-sex
or opposite-sex couples) turn to in an attempt to get a child when other avenues are not
open to them. Surrogacy has long been controversial in a way that adoption has not
24
for the reason (among others) that surrogacy is considered morally tenuous. 25 Because
the adoption contract occurs after the child is already in existence and needs a home,
adoption is viewed as a solution to a pre-existing problem. Surrogacy, on the other
hand, involves the creation of a child for purposes of exchange, and therefore can be
viewed as creating a potential problem. Adoption, as we currently know it in the United
States, involves providing a home for a child when the biological parent(s) is (are)
unable to care for the child. Because the arrangement is made after it is afait accompli,
and because there are strict regulations against giving the child to the highest bidder,
adoption is not generally characterized as "babyselling." Surrogacy, on the other hand,
is arranged in advance and involves a surrogate voluntarily entering into a pregnancy
where the sole purpose is to provide a child for someone else. In order to induce a
woman to perform such a task, payment is usually provided to the surrogate. This has
led some to characterize surrogacy as a form of babyselling. 26 In addition, at least in
theory, surrogates are not free to decide to keep the child. This differs from adoption in
that the birth mother in the adoption context is free to keep the child until the moment
that she signs away her parental rights (and in practice, this time period is often
extended).
The difference between the two practices has made surrogacy and adoption look
very different. However, in a truly free market, the two might resemble one another. In
a hypothetical world in which the marketing of children was protected and enforced, a
woman could arrange to provide a child for a couple by conceiving the child with an
unrelated man (or sperm donor) or by being artificially inseminated with the sperm of a
man in the couple (traditional surrogacy) or by being implanted with a fertilized egg
24. This is not to say that there is nothing controversial about adoption, however.
25. Evidence for this comes from the fact that adoption is widely accepted and regulated, whereas
surrogacy is not. In fact, one objection to surrogacy arrangements is that they undermine adoption laws. See
In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157-58 (wherein the court questioned the validity of surrogacy on the
grounds that it contravenes state adoption statutes and parental rights termination statutes); see also Catherine
DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic, and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by
Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 170 (2000) (referring to the controversial
nature of surrogacy).
26. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 17 (expanded ed. 1990) (pointing out that
surrogacy contracts "might be considered to violate prohibitions against baby selling"); John J. Mandler,
Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO.
L.J. 1283, 1290 (1985) ("Critics of surrogate parenthood have pointed to the facial similarities between
babyselling and surrogate parenthood arrangements involving compensation of the surrogate.").
2005]
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from the couple (gestational surrogacy). The heart of the contract in all three situations
would be the same: the woman (and perhaps the unrelated sperm donor) would agree to
relinquish all rights to the child, and the woman would agree to carry the fetus to term,
observing whatever precautions and agreeing to whatever medical procedures the
parties bargained for during the contract negotiations. In such a world (in which
surrogacy arrangements were strictly enforced), it is difficult to see how contract
adoptions would differ much from surrogacy arrangements. Indeed, contract adoptions
would amount to little more than traditional surrogacy agreements in which a sperm
donor was utilized. This Article will discuss surrogacy and contract adoption together
because both of these phenomena involve similar risks and behavioral characteristics.
27
III. PRECOMMITMENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
When commentators voice objections to the enforcement of surrogacy contracts,
they generally object on either symbolic or practical grounds, or both. Arguments about
symbolic reasons often boil down to the assertion that surrogacy results in the
commodification of babies and women (or an important aspect of women, their
reproductive ability). 28 Because commodifying a "good" that is ordinarily viewed as
unique or priceless results in the devaluation of that thing,29 commodification is almost
uniformally perceived as insidious in this context.30 A second line of attack against
surrogacy contracts involves their potential to leave the surrogates worse off than they
were prior to entering into the contract. 31 This argument states that women who are
contemplating entering surrogacy contracts cannot adequately protect themselves
against the potential for psychological harm that could result from carrying a child for
nine months only to have to surrender the child to relative strangers. Specifically, the
concern is that the surrogate will experience a change of heart and be unable to extricate
herself from the contract. Whereas a birth mother in a traditional adoption situation
may wait until the birth or after the birth to figure out how she feels about giving up the
child, in a contract adoption or surrogacy situation, the birth or gestational mother does
not have that luxury.
One way to think about surrogacy and contract adoption involves the idea of
precommitment. Precommitment strategies are controversial because of the debate over
the degree to which the self at Time 1 should be able to commit the self at Time 2 to a
binding decision. Much of the discussion on precommitment strategies is somewhat
philosophical in nature, 33 and includes questions such as: who is the real self, the Time
27. It is important to keep in mind that surrogacy is a real, on-going phenomenon, whereas contract
adoption, a strict form of "babyselling," does not appear in any legally recognized form in the United States.
28. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 20, at 309-10; see also Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The
Challenge for Feminists, THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 205, 206-08 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed.,
1992).
29. Commodification involves placing a price on something. By definition, as soon as something that is
priceless is assigned a price, its value is reduced.
30. Imagine, for example, how most people react to the notion of"baby selling" and it is clear that this is
true.
31. See Becker, supra note 20, at 309; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of
Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1820-21 (1988).
32. See Jackson, supra note 31, at 1819.
33. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Precommitment Theory in Bioethics and Constitutional Law, 81 TEX. L.
[Vol. 31:2
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1 self or the Time 2 self; and how much control should one self be able to exert over
another?34 Many of the concerns voiced by those who oppose strict enforcement of
surrogacy contracts are captured by the philosophical underpinnings of this debate. As
one commentator has noted, "[t]o give the present self the authority to act in ways that
ignore the expected wishes of his future self, as well as his past self s wishes, appears to
constitute a tyranny of the present."
35
Where the present self (the self as Time 1) is able to trade away the parenting rights
of the future self (the self at Time 2), the stakes are particularly high, and the danger
great. Concerns about protecting autonomy and freedom of contract pale in comparison
to the suffocating loss of freedom a surrogate must feel when bound by a contract that
severs all ties between herself and the child she carried and birthed. As Jackson put it,
A rule precluding specific performance of maternal-surrender clauses limits the
surrogate's freedom to contract away her right to change her mind and may result in
lower "prices" for her services because of increased uncertainty on the part of the
"purchasing" parents. Yet such restrictions may promote her future autonomy more
profoundly, avoiding impairment of the sense of self-identity that could result from
being compelled to honor a deeply regretted promise made by a "former self."
36
Research in the area of human behavior, while not useful for addressing the
philosophical or existentialist questions about what self should prevail, can provide
critical information about how good individuals are at predicting their own future
attitudes. Discussions of surrogacy incorporate notions about the psychological well-
being of the surrogate and child, but they fail to tap much of the psychological and
behavioral literature on future-oriented decision. Empirical research on how human
beings make decisions should be central to any discussion about contractual
enforcement. 3 7 Perhaps nowhere is the application of such empirical research as critical
as in the area of surrogacy, where the appropriateness of allowing one contracting party
to commit herself is at issue.
This Article contends that several behavioral principles argue against enforcement
of surrogacy contracts. Specifically, these principles suggest that women who agree to
give up a child before the child is conceived cannot possibly know how they will feel at
the end of the pregnancy. As a result, surrogates are not fully informed, and therefore,
are incapable of possessing the requisite knowledge at the time the contract is formed.
38
The following sections of the Article address problems with precommitment in the
context of surrogacy by describing aspects of human behavior that suggest either (1)
that it may be difficult for a woman to know how she will feel about her
REV. 1805 (2003); see also John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos,
50 EMORY L.J. 989 (2001).
34. For a more detailed discussion of this question, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 99, 106 (1984).
35. Brock, supra note 33, at 1810.
36. Jackson, supra note 31, at 1818.
37. A number of scholars discuss behavioral research in the context of contract formation. See, e.g.,
Korobkin, supra note 17.
38. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987) (the decisive issue for the court was
whether the plaintiff was fully informed at the time that he entered a merger agreement).
2005]
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precommitment to give up the baby at the outset or (2) that there are reasons why a
woman might change her mind over the course of a pregnancy, ultimately deciding to
keep her child.
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE SURROGACY QUESTION
The fields of economics and psychology compete for attention in legal scholarship.
Economic theory, because it includes an uncomplicated, comprehensive model of
human behavior, has gained the most attention from legal scholars.39 This theory has
centered on the "rational actor" model in explaining human behavior. The notion
behind the rational actor model is that human beings act in rational ways to maximize
their expected utility. Psychology, which attempts to account for as many factors as
possible in order to arrive at a model that has predictive validity, has not received the
same type of attention from the legal arena. As Donald Langevoort explained, "both
psychology and sociology have suffered from the inability to generate a unified
behavioral model rivaling the simplicity, elegance, and testability of the economist's
utility-maximizing rational actor.' '41 However simple and easy to apply economic
theory is, it proves inaccurate in predicting human behavior. Human beings are simply
not perfectly logical machines who operate on a rational basis according to the rules of
logic and economics.
42
The flawed premise inherent in the rational actor model was first demonstrated by
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. In the early 1970's, Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky authored several groundbreaking papers on the mental
shortcuts people take when making decisions.4 3  These shortcuts, or heuristics, are
adaptive in the sense that they may shorten the time it takes to make good decisions
under some circumstances. However, in some cases, the reliance on these heuristics
lead to "severe and systematic errors." 44 These errors lead people to misattribute the
reasons for their decisions, to overweigh certain factors in making decisions, and to
exhibit unwarranted optimism during the decision-making process.45
While other professional disciplines (e.g., business and accounting) adopted the
behavioral principles offered by psychology far sooner than did law,46 empirical
evidence of biases and proof of the suboptimal outcomes resulting from decision
making under the influence of these biases have led numerous legalscholars to call for a
reexamination of the economic model of decision making.47 Furthermore, as the work
39. For further discussion of the law and economics approach, see Gary S. Becker, The Economic
Approach to Human Behavior 14 (1976).
40. See id., for a detailed explanation of this theory.
41. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:
A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1500 (1998).
42. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi,
The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); see also Langevoort,
supra note 41, at 1499.
43. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, eds., 1982).
44. Id. at 3.
45. See Langevoort, supra note 41, at 1502-07.
46. See id. at 1502 (for a more thorough discussion of these developments).
47. In fact, our reliance on the notion of rationality may, in and of itself, be a bias. Jon Elster asserts that
[Vol. 31:2
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of Tversky and Kahneman 'have gained momentum, an increasing number of legal
commentators have incorporated psychological findings on behavioral decision theory
into their scholarship. The growing focus on behavioral theory calls into question the
economic model based upon the rational actor. Moreover, policy suggestions are
increasingly turning to a more complex, but perhaps more accurate, model of human
behavior based upon psychological theory and empirical evidence. 48 For example, Cass
Sunstein remarked, "If human beings use identifiable heuristics, and if they make
systematic errors, we might better understand why law is as it is, and we might better
generate strategies for ensuring that the law actually promotes social goals." 49 One of
the most common themes arising out of Tversky and Kahneman's work is the need for
more government and judicial oversight in certain areas of decision making.
Specifically, "[i]f parties to a contract suffer from cognitive limitations that prevent
them from making wise commitments, then there is at least a prima facie case for more
paternalistic forms of judicial intervention rather than strict reliance on freedom of
contract."
'50
A. The Optimism Bias
The optimism bias captures the idea that human beings are unrealistically
optimistic. 5 1 Specifically, individuals systematically underestimate the likelihood of
negative future outcomes. For example, people underestimate the likelihood that they
will be in a car accident or that they will be a victim of a flood or an earthquake.
52
Baruch Fischoff demonstrated this phenomenon in an early study on individuals'
reactions to warnings in product liability cases.53
Many of the risks that people underestimate involve events that are beyond their
control, such as natural disasters. However, quite often, individuals underestimate the
possibility of a bad outcome stemming from controllable behavior, such as getting fired
or being in an automobile accident.54 Furthermore, research demonstrates that people
are poor predictors of their own future attitudes, as evidenced by studies showing that
individuals systematically underestimate their chance of ever being divorced.
55
rationality creates a comforting illusion of control when we apply the rational actor model to law. Jon Elster,
Alchemies of the Mind Transmutation and Misprepresentation, 3 LEGAL THEORY 133 (1997). The idea is
that the rational actor bias, along with the other biases we have seen demonstrated, help human beings to
bring a sense of order to an otherwise chaotic world. The irony is that in relying on rationality as a basis for
human behavior, we make policy based upon predictions that ultimately turn out to be incorrect. Id.
48. See Langevoort, supra note 41, at 1529-40 (for a partial bibliography of legal work that has
employed behavioral decision theory).
49. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, supra note 1, at 752.
50. Langevoort, supra note 41, at 1511 (citing Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986)); see also Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175 (1997).
51. SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE HEALTH MIND 6-
11 (1989) (advancing the notion that an optimistic outlook is necessary for a healthy self-concept).
52. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributed Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1653, 1658-62 (1998).
53. Baruch Fischoff, Cognitive Liabilities and Product Liability, I J. PROD. LIAB. 207 (1977).
54. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics of Redistributive Legal Rules in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 288,291 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
55. See Weinstein, supra note 15. Certainly some of the people who underestimate their chances of
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If people underestimate risk when they enter contracts, perhaps the legislature and
courts should take this into account when deciding whether to strictly enforce certain
types of contracts. An argument can be made that surrogacy contracts are
fundamentally different from other types of contracts and that the same rules that apply
to contracts generally should not apply in surrogacy situations. While there is no reason
to believe that the optimistic bias is particularly influential in surrogacy decisions, there
is reason to believe that the effects of regret in a surrogacy situation are likely to be
particularly devastating for the surrogate, and potentially for the intended parents.
56
B. The Endowment Effect
The endowment effect relates to the notion that when individuals hold a good, they
demand a higher price to release that good than they would if they did not hold it.57 In
other words, simply possessing a commodity increases its subjective value to the
possessor. This means that all things being equal, there will be a gap between what
buyer is willing to pay for a good and what seller is willing to accept for that same
good.58  This empirically tested phenomenon renders inaccurate the basic economic
assumption that initial allocation is irrelevant, and calls into question the Coase
theorem, at least in some situations.
59
The endowment effect was demonstrated most clearly in a series of experiments
described by Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. In one particular
experiment, participants were divided up into three groups: sellers, buyers, and
choosers. Sellers were given a mug and asked whether they would be willing to sell the
mug for a series of prices ranging from $0 to $9.25. The buyers were asked whether
they would be willing to buy the mug for each of these same prices. Finally, the
choosers were asked whether they would prefer to receive the mug or the money for
each of these prices. The endowment effect predicted that the sellers, who already
possessed the mug, would assign a higher price to the mug than would the buyers or the
choosers. This is precisely what happened. The sellers assigned an average price of
$7.12, the choosers assigned a price of $3.12, and the buyers a price of $2.87.6 1 The
divorce are not the catalyst for the divorce, and the termination of the union is therefore not a reflection of
their own feelings about the marriage. However, given the overwhelming prevalence of the tendency to
miscalculate the risk of divorce, it stands to reason that many of those polled do end up feeling differently
about their spouse down the road.
56. Justification for these assertions appear in the following discussions of the status quo bias and the
cognitive dissonance theory.
57. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 211, 226-27 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). For discussion of a related
phenomenon, the status quo bias, see generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default
Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) [hereinafter Korobkin, Status Quo and Contract] (arguing that the
desire to maintain the current state of affairs hampers negotiations to alter default contract rules).
58. See e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
59. Id. The Coase Theorem states that assuming zero transaction costs, initial allocation is unimportant
because ultimately, the parties will bargain around the initial allocation to achieve the most efficient allocation
of assets. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also Russell
Korobkin, Status Quo and Contract, supra note 57, at 608.
60. See Kahneman, supra note 57, at 233.
61. Id.
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dramatic difference between the sellers and the buyers (and choosers) in how the mug
was valued illustrates the tendency of those who hold a good to assign a higher value to
the good than would be assigned by those who do not hold that good.
Quite often, the endowment effect is discussed in the context of evaluating default
terms. How legal rules determine initial allocation is important because whoever
receives the initial allocation will demand a higher-than-expected price to part with it.
This notion is related to a close cousin of the endowment effect, the status quo bias.
62
The status quo bias represents human beings' preference for the status quo, and their
reluctance to opt for change. 63 A penchant for maintaining the current state of affairs is
important in the context of default terms because it suggests that parties will tend to
keep whatever terms are the default. 64  Korobkin asserts in his paper, Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and
Form Terms, that the emphasis should be not upon parties' preference for default or
other terms, but rather, that the emphasis should be on the choice between action or
inaction. 65 He contends that a "bias in favor of inaction minimizes possible future
regret that a negotiator might experience if agreed upon contractual terms turn out, in
hindsight, to be undesirable."
' 66
It might appear that the status quo bias is inapplicable to the surrogacy situation
because the default is that a woman keeps her baby. In contracting away that right, she
is expressing satisfaction with the terms of the contract. One might ask how this
situation is like determining default rules. In both situations, the status quo bias
influences feelings of regret. In the classic contract situation, a party rejects a fair price
for a good in favor of holding onto the good because of the fear of regretting the loss of
the good. In the surrogacy situation, after the contract is entered, the status quo changes
from one in which the woman is not a mother to one in which she is. By the time the
surrogate becomes a mother, she has committed herself to losing the status quo;
changing the situation, giving up the baby. In other words, in the typical contract
situation, a party would hold out for a higher than market price prior to entering the
contract, but upon receiving that higher price, would happily make the deal and suffer
no regret. However, the unique nature of a surrogacy agreement is such that the
contract is entered before the "seller" has possession of the "good." At the initial point
(when the contract is entered), her valuation of the "good" is equal to that of a non-
possessor. It is only after conception, when she is carrying the fetus, that a surrogate
"possesses" the good and will therefore experience the increase in value.
The increase in subjective value is particularly likely because of the unique nature
of a surrogacy arrangement. Importantly, unlike a true "good," a potential child is not
fungible. Once a child is lost, that child can never be replaced. The child is unique,
62. The status quo bias and the endowment effect are essentially different names for the same
phenomenon. The endowment effect can be thought of as a particular manifestation of the status quo bias.
63. See Korobkin, Status Quo and Contract, supra note 57, at 608; see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia
and Preferences in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (1998) [hereinafter, Korobkin, Inertia].
64. See generally, Korobkin, Status Quo and Contract, supra note 57.




one-of-a-kind, and "priceless." 67 Moreover, characteristics of a pregnancy can result in
emotional connections forming between the potential child and the pregnant woman.
This emotional connection can emphasize the uniqueness of the potential child in the
surrogate's mind.68 For instance, a fetus' motions in utero are widely said to create a
bond between mother (surrogate) and child. 69  These characteristics increase the
chances that the surrogate will attach a higher value to the potential child after
conception, and perhaps especially after she feels the potential child begin to move.
70
Furthermore, even if the surrogate's attachment to the potential child were not greater
than that of the intended parents (who, admittedly, probably desperately want the child),
the surrogate is unable to bargain effectively at the time of contract formation because
at the time she does not yet have any connection to the potential child. To ask a woman
to pre-commit to forfeiting her rights in a child who has not yet been conceived is
tantamount to asking a merchant to determine the selling price for an extremely
precious item that he has never held, touched, or seen.71
Of course, a child is not an object, nor is a child like an object.72 It is this very
dissimilarity between a potential child and an ordinary good that makes the sale of a
parental right prior to the creation of the potential child so problematic in the first
place. 73 Given the mug experiment, described above, we know that human beings grow
attached to objects simply by virtue of possessing them. It stands to reason that this
bias would be particularly acute when the "possession" was a potential child.
C. The Problem of Market Manipulation
In a thoughtful article published in the New York University Law Review, Jon
Hanson and Douglas Kysar argue that the market is not passive in the face of cognitive
biases, but rather that economic and other incentives drive players to exploit these
biases.74 They assert that the presence of these heuristics "makes individual decision-
makers susceptible to manipulation by those able to influence the context in which the
67. This notion that a human being is priceless is particularly complicated in a surrogacy arrangement,
where a price must necessarily be assessed. Of course, one might deal with this issue by asserting that the
monetary exchange is not for the baby, but for the service performed. See my discussion, however, refuting
this notion at supra note 2 and accompanying text.
68. See Jackson, supra note 31, at 1811 (emphasizing the strong emotional connection the mother makes
with a child she carries).
69. See generally HEIDI MURKOFF, ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU'RE EXPECTING 174 (3d ed.
2002); GLADE B. CURTIS & JUDITH SCHULER, YOUR PREGNANCY WEEK BY WEEK 248-49 (4th ed. 2000);
MIRIAM STOPPARD, CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, & BIRTH 194 (2000).
70. Even if the child was originally unwanted, these feelings of attachment may develop in some women
throughout the pregnancy, especially after quickening. See M. H. KLAUS & J. H. KENNELL, PARENT-INFANT
BONDING 263 (1982); see also M. H. KLAUS & J. H. KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 46 (1976)
(quickening refers to the stage of gestation at which fetal motion is felt).
71. This analogy does not take into account the emotional factor involved with the bonding process that
most woman experience with their unborn children during pregnancy.
72. However, Posner analogizes the sale of babies to the sale of an ordinary good. See Richard A.
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 64 (1987).
73. The argument that surrogacy does not involve a sale lacks credibility. This is addressed below. See
supra Part I1.
74. Jon H. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630 (1999).
[Vol. 31:2
Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation
decisions are made." 75 According to Hanson and Kysar, the party who has control is
the party who has the power to control the flow of information and the presentation of
options.
76
Just as it has been demonstrated that government regulators and product
manufacturers can "shape people's behavior in desired directions," 77 potential parents
and their agents might use tactics to exert. undue influence on a potential surrogate. In
the course of negotiating a surrogacy contract, the intended parents typically pay all of
the associated expenses. 78 This puts the intended parents in a better position than the
surrogate to control many aspects of the negotiation situation. While ultimately it is
true that the surrogate may decline to sign on the dotted line, a party to any negotiation
is likewise free to reject a contract in a free-market system. The bottom line is that the
party who holds the most resources is the party who has the greatest ability to
manipulate the situation.
79
D. Social Influences on Self Knowledge and Cognitive Dissonance
Human beings are highly dependent upon the social world. Social psychologists
have developed a series of empirically supported theories that propose that an
individual's concept of self is largely shaped by feedback from others. In a paper by
William Swann and Stephen Read, this phenomenon is illustrated by a series of studies
that demonstrate that individuals seek verification of their own self-conceptions through
social feedback. The concept that individuals learn about themselves by observing
others' impressions of them is not a new one. This appraisal process has been termed
the "looking glass self."8 1  In fact, the tendency of people to look outward for
information to evaluate themselves is so strong that in one series of studies, it was found
that observers (who were strangers) were as accurate at determining the reasons for an
actor's behavior as the actor was himself.82 This finding suggests that human beings,
rather than having a unique insight into their own minds, look for explanations
concerning their own behaviors in the same places observers do-the social conscience.
In other words, the social self is so fundamental to our own self-comprehension that we
75. Id. at 635.
76. Id.
77. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1536
(1998); see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 74, at 637.
78. See James J. Dalessio & Weldon E. Havins, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium: Proposed
Model Regulating "Non-Traditional" Gestationa Surrogacy Contracts, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675
(2000).
79. See generally, Hanson & Kysar, supra note 74. Hanson and Kysar make the point that, "the presence
of unyielding cognitive biases makes individual decision makers susceptible to manipulation by those able to
influence the context in which decisions are made." Id. at 635.
80. See William B. Swann, Jr. & Stephen J. Read, Self Verification Processes: How We Sustain Our Self-
Conceptions, 17 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 351 (1981).
81. See generally, C. H. COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 183-84 (2d ed. 1902). See
also G. H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY 138 (1934).
82. See generally Timothy D. Wilson & Julie I. Stone, Limitations of Self-Knowledge: More on Telling
More Than We Can Know in SELF, SITUATIONS, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 167 vol. 6 (P. Shaver ed., 1985).
2005]
Journal of Legislation
draw our explanations for our own attitudes and behaviors from a common pool of
understanding that is shared with other members of society.
83
Women who agree to be surrogates are likely to encounter social disapproval of
their decision. In a recent survey conducted by Harris Interactive for RESOLVE (the
National Infertility Association), only 13% of respondents from the general population
in the United States would consider surrogacy, as opposed to 66% who would consider
adopting a child. This general hesitancy to promote surrogacy as a reproductive
alternative is echoed in state legislation across the United States. The vast majority of
states either have no legislation to provide for enforcement of surrogacy contracts,
expressly refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts, or criminalize paid surrogacy.84 Right
or wrong, much of the country expresses ambivalent feelings over the issue of
surrogacy, a sentiment that is likely to have profound effects on the women who enter
surrogacy contracts. The obviousness of the (pregnancy) condition makes it likely that
surrogates will have to choose between allowing people to treat them as the typical
expectant mother or explaining their somewhat unique situation. Either choice is likely
to lead the surrogate to face some painful obstacles. Whether the surrogate "plays
along" and is drawn into the anticipation of impending motherhood, or faces criticism
from those who disagree with surrogacy on principle (or simply cannot understand the
decision), she is likely to encounter social disapproval that could cause her to begin to
rethink her decision.
The theory of cognitive dissonance provides an explanation for how a surrogate
facing such difficult circumstances might resolve her dilemma. This theory addresses
the processes that individuals undergo when faced with a situation in which their
behaviors and their attitudes are incongruent. According to dissonance theory, all
human beings are driven to maintain consistency between and among their attitudes and
behaviors. 85  As a result, when attitudes or beliefs and behavior are inconsistent,
individuals feel profound discomfort. This feeling of "dissonance" causes them to do
whatever is necessary to achieve a resolution-to bring the attitude and the behavior
into line.86 Therefore, when such an incongruity exists, an individual will either change
the cognition (the attitude or belief) to make it consistent with the behavior or alter the
behavior so that it matches the cognition.
87
A surrogate who encounters repeated negative feedback regarding her decision will
likely experience dissonance, which she will have to resolve. Her cognition that she has
made a good decision will conflict with the messages she is getting about how
wonderful it would be to keep the baby or how strange (or wrong) it is for her to be
willing to give up the child. Particularly because there are limited support systems for
surrogates, 88 she may have difficulty finding support for her decision as a mechanism
for eliminating dissonance.
83. Id.
84. See http://www.surrogacy.com/articles/news_view.asp?1D=76 for an overview of state legislation on
surrogacy (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
85. See generally Festinger, supra note 18.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Evidence for this comes from the relatively large number of states who fail to have any type of
legislation whatsoever regarding surrogacy.
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V. FAMOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST PATERNALISM
A. Richard Epsiein
Richard Epstein, in his article Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, argues for specific enforcement of surrogacy contracts. 89 He addresses
three objections to surrogacy contracts: the first relates to defects in the bargaining
process that could undermine the mutual gain assumption; the second relates to adverse
external effects; and the third pertains to problems of coordination, freeriding, and
holdouts. Because this Article argues that surrogacy is problematic specifically because
the surrogate cannot adequately predict what her state of mind will be at the end of the
pregnancy, I will focus on Epstein's discussion of the mutual gain assumption.
90
In the first step toward his ultimate conclusion that surrogate's interests are
adequately protected, Epstein asserts the validity of a system of voluntary exchange.
9 1
Epstein focuses on Aristotle's view of exchange. Epstein notes that although Aristotle
believed in tipping the balance in favor of free exchange, he was wary of situations in
which a weakness in one party created the potential for exploitation.92  From here,
Epstein leaps to the conclusion that "the safer presumption by far is that people know
their own interest well and that contract usually are mechanisms to achieve mutual gain,
not mutual exploitation. ' 93 His reasoning centers on the rational actor model notion
that people only enter voluntarily into contracts where there is the prospect of mutual
gain.
94
Epstein grudgingly admits that where adequate safeguards do not exist, free
exchange should be restricted. Nevertheless, he concludes that "these problems do not
offer any serious argument for the prohibition or regulation of surrogacy
arrangements." 95Because of the particularly sensitive nature of the exchange, Epstein
assumes that the contract contemplates any potential risks or contingencies. 96  He
argues that because the intended parents care deeply about the well being of the future
child, they select the surrogate mother carefully. 97 Likewise, he points out that any
potential surrogate will exercise caution in selecting the intended parents.
98
It may be true that the parties will generally be vigilant in screening one another.
However, if one imagines a world in which Epstein's conception of surrogacy reigns,
where there are no restrictions on surrogacy whatsoever, it is not difficult to imagine
89. Epstein, supra note 12, at 2305.
90. Even assuming that Epstein is correct in dismissing concerns related to external effects and
transaction problems, a cogent rebuttal to his assertion that surrogates interests' are adequately protected is
sufficient to undermine his premise that surrogacy contracts should be enforced. In fact, one of the most
powerful arguments against enforcement of surrogacy contracts is the potential for exploitation of the
surrogate.
91. Epstein, supra note 12, at 2310-16.




96. Id. at 2317.




disadvantaged women with few or no resources entering ill-advised surrogacy
arrangements. More importantly, a surrogate's carefully reasoned selection of intended
parents would do little to protect against the type of unanticipated regret discussed
earlier in this Article. Accordingly, the fact that most surrogates and intended parents
will voluntarily search out the appropriate characteristics in one another is not sufficient
to argue in favor of enforcement of surrogacy contracts.
Ironically, it is Epstein's admission that surrogacy arrangements are special, and
not like other types of exchanges, that leads to his next argument that the government
should stay out of this sphere. In a somewhat undeveloped and circular argument,
Epstein seems to maintain that because surrogacy arrangements are particularly
delicate, parties will take special care in drafting the contract, and therefore, all parties
will enter the contract fully protected. 99 Epstein buttresses this conclusion by adding
that "the norms of disclosure dominate."' 00 It would appear that this argument rests
upon the counterintuitive notion that the more protection the parties need, the fewer
regulations should be imposed. Moreover, the blanket assertion that the norms of
disclosure dominate seems no more likely to be true than one might expect in any
number of transactions that are already heavily regulated or banned.
10 1
Epstein asserts that "the need for ... precautions ... should be quite apparent to
contracting parties, making it quite dangerous to pile on additional restrictions, whose
major purpose is typically to stymie the transaction under the guise of supplying full
information to the potential surrogate."' 102 However, it is difficult to understand why
the intended parents in Epstein's world would be at all concerned about precautions
aimed at assuring that the surrogate be fully informed. After all, under this regime, the
contract would be fully and specifically enforced. Would it not be tempting then for a
childless couple to encourage a potential surrogate to enter the agreement with as little
information as possible? Because there would be no recourse for the surrogate once the
contract was signed and the child conceived, there would be little for the couple to lose
in risking that the surrogate would regret her decision. Epstein's assertion that the
intended parents would not seek out a surrogate who Was easy to exploit because they
would have an interest in selecting a gestational mother who could fend for herself is
unconvincing. Given the choice between finding a woman who would agree to serve as
surrogate or remaining childless, no reasonable couple would forfeit the opportunity at
parenthood because the surrogate seemed to agree too readily to make them parents.
Furthermore, presuming that the surrogate was entering the agreement with the purpose
of making money, the precautions suggested by Epstein would come entirely at the
expense of the intended couple. Although Epstein agrees that "no one will (as no one
has) believe that caveat emptor is the appropriate rule for surrogacy contracts,"' 103 it is
difficult to see how Epstein's system would provide the intended couple with any
incentive to provide the potential surrogate with the cautionary voices of counselors or
99. Id. at 2317.
100. Id. at2318.
101. Examples include prostitution, where both parties have a profound interest in making sure the other is
disease free, and mercy euthanasia, where one would expect a free exchange of information between the actor,
the physician, and the patient.
102. Epstein, supra note 12, at 2318.
103. Id.
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other professionals. Furthermore, psychological and behavioral research illustrates the
inherent fallacy in the presumption that warnings are sufficient to assure that individuals
entering precommitments are able to accurately gauge how they will feel at
performance time.
Finally, Epstein addresses the argument that the "mere fact that the woman chooses
to enter into such a contract shows that she occupies a subordinate sphere and has
1104allowed her self to become debased, or at least exploited .... " He argues against the
notion that surrogacy arrangements are base, defending the position of the childless
couple, for whom surrogacy is probably a last and desperate attempt to become parents.
However, here, I think he misses the point of those who oppose surrogacy contracts.
Few commentators would debate the legitimacy of a childless couple's desire for a
child. In most cases, the intended parents are profoundly sympathetic people. However
sympathetic the intended parents may be, their plight is the status quo. It seems to me
that in order to endorse an affirmative practice that involves forcibly removing a child
from a woman who carried the child in her body for nine months requires more than
heartfelt sympathy.
B. Richard Posner and Elisabeth Landes
Richard Posner has argued for free market adoptions in his controversial article
with Elisabeth Landes, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 105 and in his follow-up
piece, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions.106 In Posner's hypothetical world,
under a free-market regime, a pregnant woman who might otherwise terminate a
pregnancy would be "induced" to continue the pregnancy and to give the child up for
adoption by proving economic incentives. 10 7  Posner describes the exchange of
monetary compensation for a baby as efficient, since "the parties would not make it if
they did not think it would make both of them better off."' 1 8 This is another example of
reliance on the classic economic model of the rational actor. Nowhere does this
argument account for the optimistic bias, which has been demonstrated to reduce the
likelihood that people will accurately judge future risks.
10 9
Because Posner describes a situation in which the bargain would necessarily have
to be made before the decision to carry the fetus to term or to terminate the pregnancy
was made, the situation is analogous to a contract adoption or a surrogacy arrangement
in which the woman must pre-commit-bind herself to giving up a child before she has
gotten to know the child. As discussed above, a lack of knowledge about the future
severely compromises a potential surrogate's ability to bargain. Any agreement made
at an early point in a pregnancy would not account for the risk that the gestational
mother might feel very differently about giving up the child once the pregnancy
progressed to the point where the fetus could be felt and a bond established. Finally, the
104. Id.
105. Elisabeth Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(June 1978).
106. Posner, supra note 72.
107. Id. at 63.
108. Id. at60.
109. See discussion supra Part IV A.
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problem of market manipulation might be particularly acute in situations in which the
woman being induced to give up rights in the child was unintentionally pregnant at the
time that the contract was formed. Women who find themselves facing an unwanted
pregnancy are typically lacking in resources, as well as education and social support.
110
A paucity of resources might induce the woman to commit to giving up rights in the
child for the right price before she has a good sense of what she is giving up.
One of the objections to "babyselling" has been that under such a regime, the price
of babies would be driven up, and those who could afford to pay, rather than those most
deserving, would end up gaining access to the babies. Accompanying this fear is the
concern that those with the most wealth would also be able to apply the most pressure to
pregnant women in order to gain their compliance. Hence, the argument goes,
babyselling hurts everyone but the very wealthy. Posner argues that increasing the
number of babies "on the market" would increase the ability of those who were not
wealthy enough to gain access to babies. However, Posner himself admits that even
under his regime, there would be natural limits on the number of children who would be
up for sale.l I1  Therefore, there would still be a relatively thin market. In the context of
this thin market, placing fewer constraints on the exchange of babies would only serve
to drive up the cost of babies, by making it easier for the relatively few babies to go to
the highest bidder. 12  The result would be to increase the chances that the intended
parents involved in surrogacy and contract or free-market adoptions would be in
particularly good positions to manipulate the market, as discussed above.
However objectionable Posner's proposal for free-market adoption may be on other
grounds, his notion about the remedy for breach of contract marks a substantial break
with Epstein's approach, and as such, reduces the chances of surrogate exploitation in
the hypothetical world he has created. Posner maintains that should the natural mother
change her mind, she should be permitted to keep the baby.l13 Providing the woman
with a loophole would alleviate many of the problems caused by asking a woman to
l10. See Martha Cole McGrew & William B. Shore, The Problem of Teenage Pregnancy, J. FAM.
PRACTICE (1991), found on-line at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0689/is-nl-v32/ai10380944
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005) (pointing out the high incidence of unwanted teenage pregnancy and the lack of
resources available to pregnant teenagers. "Children of teenage parents frequently live in homes that are near
or below poverty level. They often require public assistance for the basics of life: food, clothing, and shelter.
There is an increased incidence of school failure and dropout in teenage parents and subsequently in their
children." Id.) The fact that women who give their babies up for adoption lack education, support, and
resources makes sense, as these factors influence one's ability to care adequately for a child.
111. Id. According to the 1988 National Survey of Family Growth, there are roughly three adoption
seekers for every child placed up for adoption. This statistic does not account for adoption preferences that
might limit the pool of "acceptable" children. For example, adoption seekers of a particular ethnic or
religious background might only consider adoption if a child matching their own background were available.
112. Posner addresses this argument, saying that it is unlikely that "allowing people to bid for babies with
dollars would drive up the price of babies." Posner, supra note 72, at 65. His argument rests upon the notion
of the gray market many allege exist under the current adoption scheme. This "blended" market consists of a
combination of the low "lawful market price" of adoption and the high costs and fees that are associated with
the process. The cost of adoption is certainly high, and probably prohibitively so for many. However, given
that a lawful free market adoption would still involve doctors bills, hospital costs, plane fares, and as Posner
suggests, screening fees and payment for the surrogate's missed work opportunities, in addition to the
premium that the intended parents would have to pay in order to outbid other interested couples, it is difficult
to imagine how such a regime would not drive up the costs of obtaining a child. Id.
113. Id. at 67.
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commit to surrendering a child under uncertain circumstances. This approach would
also level the playing field in cases where the surrogate was particularly vulnerable.
Posner focuses specifically of adoption. It is important to note that there are critical
differences between traditional adoption and contract adoption or surrogacy
arrangements. The critical difference between traditional adoption and surrogacy is that
a surrogate may or may not be biologically related to the child she carries. Even where
the surrogate is the biological mother of the child she carries, the male of the intended
couple is typically the biological father. Furthermore, in both surrogacy and contract
adoption, unlike in a traditional adoption situation, the intended parents have not caused
the child to come into being-the child would have existed regardless of their desire to
be parents. Nevertheless, when considering the implications of pre-commitment in all
three situations, traditional adoption, contract adoption, and surrogacy, psychological
evidence provides reason to believe that the woman who agrees to carry the child does
not have all of the information necessary to make an informed decision to
unequivocally commit herself"
14
C. Surrogacy Proponents' Failure to Address Behavioral Research
Epstein, Landes and Posner, and others who espouse enforcement of surrogacy
contracts 115 have interesting and cogent responses to several areas where opponents
have raised concerns. However, these advocates of surrogacy have failed to adequately
address the relevant questions raised in light of information about heuristics and biases
and market manipulation demonstrated by empirical research in the behavioral sciences.
Almost all advocates of surrogacy assume that potential surrogates fully comprehend
and take advantage of information about the potential pitfalls of surrogacy and are able
to thoroughly assess the situation prior to entering a contract. In fact, some have gone
as far as to suggest that if a surrogate cannot "assess what her emotions would be at the
end of the pregnancy" then we cannot hold any person to any contract "when their
emotions may change over time." 116 However, as discussed in this Article, the decision
to become a surrogate is unlike the decision to sell widgets for many, many reasons.
Commentators who blithely assert that people only enter into contracts that are in their
own best interests ignore evidence that in certain situations individuals make systematic
errors in the process of decision making. The known existence of these errors creates a
mandate that courts and the legislature take these errors into account when determining
whether to strictly enforce certain types of contracts.
114. The position argued in this Article is one taken by courts, which have held that a natural mother's
irrevocable agreement, prior to birth, even prior to conception, to surrender a child to an adoptive couple, is
unenforceable in private placement adoption. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (N.J. 1988); see also e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(e) (West 1993) (explaining that "[a] surrender of a child shall not be valid if taken prior
to the birth of the child... [or] ... if taken within 72 hours of the birth of the child").
115. See e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995); Elise Bruhl, Motherhood and Contract: Always Crashing in the
Same Car, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (2000-2001); Amanda Mechell Holliday, Who's Your Daddy (and
Mommy)? Creating Certainty for Texas Couples Entering into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1101 (2003); Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of Female Autonomy
in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 742 (2003).
116. Munyon, supra note 115, at 717.
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VI. MORE SUPPORT FOR NON-ENFORCEMENT OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS
This Article focuses on behavioral research indicating that potential surrogates are
incapable of knowing what is in their own best interest when they enter a surrogacy
arrangement. However, a number of legal scholars have made this argument without
relying on social science research to bolster their case. As Vicki Jackson puts it,
[b]ecoming and being a parent is one of the most fundamental aspects of adult human
identity, and thus should be parted with only in the most voluntary of settings. Given
the changes in feeling that we know frequently occur, and that we generally want to
occur, during pregnancy and at birth, the informed voluntariness of the choice to give
up the child is at its peak when made with full awareness of the pain entailed-after
the child comes into being. This is so for any surrogate: it may be quite difficult,
even impossible, accurately to evaluate, prior to birth, the ability to surrender the
child... the pain of the surrogate mother who cannot voluntarily give up her child
can be very great-it is a pain I am not eager to quantify, and that I do not think
society should encourage women to quantify in monetary or exchange terms. It is,
therefore, a pain that I do not believe can or should be permitted to be the subject of
binding, prebirth [sic] contracts.
117
Katharine Bartlett has made the point that among those who deal with child custody
issues, there is a tacit understanding that the connection between a woman and the child
she carries is profound, and may grow beyond that which was anticipated by the
woman.li1 This idea has been used to argue (as this Article does) that this bond is such
that no surrogacy agreement should be specifically enforced.
119
The argument is sometimes made that women who have already had children are
psychologically prepared and aware of what giving up a child involves. However, if a
potential surrogate has never irrevocably signed away her rights to a child, it is difficult
to see how she could fully comprehend the consequences. 12  At the time of birth, the
surrogate has not only been physically attached to the child for nine months, but she has
developed an emotional attachment to the child as well. 121 A woman forms a bond with
each child,122 and each of these bonds is unique.
12 3
117. Jackson, supra note 31, at 1818-20 (emphasis added).
118. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 333 (1988) ("Within custody
law, there is a strong ideology that through pregnancy and childbirth an enduring bond develops between
mother and child which cannot easily be broken. This mystical bond is perceived of as inevitable and more
powerful than any woman can realize in advance.").
119. Maurice M. Sub, Surrogate Motherhood: An Argument for Denial of Specific Performance, 22
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 357, 362-69 (1989) (arguing that the bonding interests of the birth mother, which
have been demonstrated by research, should prevent specific performance unless consent is given after the
child's birth).
120. See Macklin, supra note 9, at 60 ("[I]t has been argued that no one is capable of granting truly
informed consent to be a surrogate mother. This argument contends that even if a woman has already borne
children, she cannot know what it is like to have to give them up after birth.").
121. According to the results of studies of pregnant women by doctors Klaus and Kennel, a woman
usually experiences feelings of attachment toward her unborn child. See M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL,
MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 42 (1976); see also M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, PARENT-INFANT BONDING 263
(1982).
122. See Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in American Society,
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As I have argued in this Article, legal commentators have pointed out that
enforcing surrogacy agreements is also likely to make victims of women who are
economically and otherwise disadvantaged. 124 Economic strain makes it more likely
that potential surrogates will enter into agreements that are ultimately devastating. As
Jackson points out,
to the extent that surrogate mothers are in pressed financial circumstances, they may
be even more likely to make an agreement that does not reflect the true cost to them
of the undertaking they are embarking on, because immediate economic pressures
result in an inability to value correctly the future 'costs' of being pregnant and of
giving up a baby.'
25
Ultimately, women with few options may end up becoming surrogates without
truly understanding the consequences down the road. 126  This is not to belittle or
condescend to women of limited financial means. As I point out elsewhere in this
Article, research demonstrating phenomena such as the optimism bias and endowment
effect has been demonstrated with college-level and graduate students. 127 Moreover,
research finding that human beings are terrible at knowing themselves and their own
attitudes has been illustrated using these same, highly educated, resource-rich groups.
128
Given the data, it would seem incumbent upon society to protect all members of society,
and especially those who might be particularly vulnerable. As Gerald Dworkin has
argued, paternalism in the form of governmental restrictions on individual freedoms
when these restrictions are intended to protect the individual is justified. In such
instances, paternalistic intervention safeguards a broader freedom for the individual.
129
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of scholarship discussing
surrogacy and from those in the field of law and human behavior. Although the two
areas have flirted with each other occasionally, very little psychological research has
been directly applied to the question of whether surrogacy contracts should be enforced.
This Article has examined several biases in how human beings make decisions and has
in BEYOND BABY M: ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 9 (Dianne M. Bartels et al. eds.,
1990) (discussing how the fetus interacts and develops a relationship with its mother during gestation).
123. See Suh, supra note 119, at 379 (arguing that the bonding interests of the birth mother, which have
been demonstrated by research, should prevent specific performance unless consent is given after the child's
birth).
124. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 31, at 1819 ("Moreover, the likelihood that most paid surrogate
mothers will be women who are economically (and educationally) disadvantaged vis-a-vis the other
contracting parties is another exploitive feature of the real world impact.").
125. Id.
126. Becker, supra note 20, at 309. ("Women without much money will be tempted, because they have so
few other options, to sign contracts that might ultimately be extremely painful for them to go through with.").
127. See supra Part IV A.
128. Timothy D. Wilson & Julie I. Stone, Limitations of Self-Knowledge: More on Telling More Than We
Can Know in REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY vol. 6 (P. Shaver ed., 1985).
129. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 118 (R. Wasserstrom ed., 1983).
20051
Journal of Legislation
argued that they are relevant to determining whether potential surrogates are in a
position to make an informed decision about whether to enter a binding agreement to
conceive, bear, and give up a child. Specifically, I have argued that the optimism bias
and the endowment effect (or status quo bias) increase the likelihood that many
surrogates will overestimate their own willingness to part with the child by the end of
the pregnancy. In addition to having her decision influenced by biases, I have asserted
that a surrogate is likely to experience cognitive dissonance in the course of the
pregnancy. Because surrogacy is still somewhat "experimental" and lacks broad
support, any decision to become a surrogate is likely to generate some level of criticism,
disapproval, or misunderstanding, resulting in dissonance in the surrogate. As a result
of this dissonance, surrogates will often seek to change the dissonance-causing behavior
and will end up wishing to terminate the surrogacy arrangement.
Strong empirical evidence of the potential for biases and dissonance-reduction
strategies to drive human behavior belie the notion that individual potential surrogates
can accurately predict prior to a pregnancy what their attitudes will be toward the end of
that pregnancy. This is not in any way to suggest that potential surrogates are less in
tune with their own preferences or less responsible or trustworthy than other members
of society. The data supporting the optimism bias, the endowment effect, and cognitive
dissonance were primarily conducted on men and women from undergraduate and
graduate educational institutions. These subjects are likely to have the resources and
level of sophistication at least comparable to the average member of society in the
United States (and possibly greater). Importantly, although currently only women can
be surrogates, there is no reason to think that men (were they able to carry a fetus)
would fare any better in being able to predict their own willingness to abandon all rights
to the child at the conclusion of the pregnancy. The bottom line is that all human beings
are subject to the psychological phenomena discussed in this Article. The very
robustness of the results of the studies discussed suggests that there is little that can be
done to counteract these tendencies.
Although some surrogates certainly might make an informed decision and never
look back, there is ample evidence of the potential for many surrogates to come to
regret their decision to give up the child they carry. Armed with this information, it
behooves courts and legislatures to assure that surrogacy contracts are not strictly
enforced. While surrogacy may be the best option for some infertile couples, these
couples should enter agreements with the understanding that the risk of the surrogate
changing her mind is ever-present. Undoubtedly, the turmoil caused by a surrogate
changing her mind is great-particularly where the child is biologically tied to the
intended father, mother, or both. The potential for such a situation should lead
legislatures to discourage surrogacy in the first place. However, given that surrogacy
arrangements may be entered without the blessings of the state, state legislatures should
be prepared to deal with such eventualities by crafting laws that make clear the
responsibilities of the adults involved in the decision and by mandating joint custody
arrangements where necessary.
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